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Who do you Trust in Aid Evaluation?
It’s a mystery to me how
the traditional system of “monitoring and evaluation” of aid projects
has persisted for so long. Surely we should have been able to recognize
decades ago that having internal personnel evaluate the impact of their
organization’s projects is generally a flawed endeavor. In the
competitive NGO world where countless organizations are competing for
the same limited funds, incentive structures aren’t set up for
legitimate internal analysis of impact and results. Donors want proof
that their money has produced measurable results, therefore, for the
sake of their own institutional survival and the continuation of donor
grants, it’s not surprising that many NGOs feel pressured to get
“creative” in their evaluations.
While working for a large international NGO years ago, I
witnessed evaluators choosing to proudly report on things such as the
number of attendees at regional workshops (statistics that certainly
didn’t represent how many of the attendees actually stayed awake during
said workshops, let alone benefited from the educational opportunity in
any way). But the numbers seemed to please the donors. In the meantime,
my scathing memo to senior management about the inappropriate and
ineffective field projects I was encountering was completely ignored.
What was the purpose of evaluating the projects in the first place if
the findings didn’t contribute to meaningful changes in policies and
practices?
The perverse incentive structures that are
driven in large part by the donor culture tend to force most NGOs to
paint a pretty picture of their work. However, this seems like an
enormous waste of time and money. I am thrilled to see some groups like
MIT’s Poverty Action Lab pioneering more rigorous methodologies to
evaluate development projects, but I recognize that these sorts of
randomized trials can only be used for quantifiable outcomes and they
can be extremely costly to perform.
So in the absence of a culture of external evaluation or any
legitimate “watchdog” group for international aid organizations, what
other options do we have when it comes to finding evaluations that we
trust? My old stats professor will probably kill me for this, but what
ever happened to good old-fashioned gut instincts? Do you trust
anecdotal reports by people who have visited field projects and come
away with certain perceptions?
I started considering this concept recently when Marc Maxson at
Global Giving introduced me to a new project they’re running that
allows people who visit any of their countless field sites to submit
“postcards from the field”. These blog-like reports written by
non-professionals (mostly by interns and student travelers) have an
open-ended framework and are only guided by the question, “what would
you tell your friends about this project?” According to Marc, “gut
feelings about recommending a project are broad enough to predict
deeper problems.” However, as I scrolled through the “postcards” I had
a really hard time finding any that were critical of the organizations
they highlighted. Are visitors afraid to report on problems or are
these organizations actually as perfect as they sound? Marc informed me
that, “most volunteers try to self-filter and only say good things
publicly, but privately send in negative comments.” Well, it’s not
perfect, but at least it’s a start!
So I have a few questions for the SocialEdge community: 1) Who
do you trust when it comes to aid evaluations? 2) Would
positive/negative evaluations influence your decision to donate to a
particular organization? 3) What is the point of having an entire field
of “Monitoring and Evaluation” when the incentive structures of most
NGOs are merely set up to tell donors what they want to hear?, and 4)
Is there a role for visitor feedback and reviews of aid projects that
are based on short-term experiences and gut instincts?
Tell me what you think!



the honest truth starts with walking through a development project
Regardless of the self-filtering problem, we think visitor postcards have been a major success because more people are getting a first-hand account of what projects look like. And (as our case study will show) it also works to reform a problem project. The power of real-time feedback loops was enough to cause the organization visited to dissolve and reform under new leadership of a group of underserved beneficiaries. This happened in spite of the "self-filtering" problem we discussed.
Visitors often don't realize that they omit inconsistent (negative) details when they have good rapport with the people the meet. This is human nature, and affects tourists and evaluators alike. I urge you to read "The Surprising Power of Neighborly Advice" from Science Magazine (ca March 2009), which shows that (a) strangers' gut feelings are more reliable trust indicators than a set of facts and (b) most people DO NOT BELIEVE THIS even though they act on it.
I cannot underscore strongly enough that getting more people to set foot in more village-level development projects to confirm their basic existence would transform the way that money is spent, for a variety of reasons. The current "big aid" system allows too much fraud. In 2005 Haliburton misplaced 12 BILLION dollars allocated to projects in Iraq that were never real enough for a visitor to walk through.
I hope you'll attend our talk at ISIRC in September, 2009 - Oxford!